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There are a lot of goods which have network externalities. While the 
number of players who have such a good is small, they may not get enough 
utility from the goods. That is, players have an incentive to delay their decision, 
when they purchase the goods with network externalities. Delay causes negative 
effects on players' utility, so equilibrium with delay is inefficient. We propose a 
way to settle this problem using a kind of call option. If we use the way and 
some conditions are satisfied, all players purchase the good and the delay 
decreases in equilibrium.  
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1.  Introduction 
        People have an incentive to delay their decision in some economic 
environments. For example, when new durable products such as digital cameras 
or DVD recorders are introduced in the market, many consumers do not 
purchase them immediately; they wait and see whether the products sell well in 
the market. Similarly, firms with an investment opportunity (e.g. a plan to 
establish large plants in China) do not necessarily exercise it in advance of rival 
firms; they postpone their action until the rivals carry out their option and it 
ends in a success. 
    The above examples contain common features: uncertainty about results and 
irreversibility of actions. Consumers put off their decision to buy a new 
expensive durable, because the quality of the durable is uncertain and, once they 
buy it, they must use it during long periods even though not suitable for them. 
The same logic can apply to firms' behavior; firms hesitate to carry out a project 
with huge costs because they do not have confidence about the success of the 
project.   3
    In addition, there are cases where it is beneficial for people to coordinate 
their action with others'. Some consumer goods have a feature of so called " 
network externalities". For example, the value of a cellular phone network that 
each subscriber obtains increases with the number of subscribers of the 
network, because each user can make a contact with many other users with low 
costs. Similarly, a firm has an incentive to make a plant in an area where many 
other firms have already established their plants because the productivity of the 
plant increases due to "agglomeration economies". Therefore, in facing with 
network externalities (or agglomeration economies), consumers (or firms) have 
a motivation to observe others' decision and to delay their decision for fear that 
they choose a different choice from others (" coordination failures"). 
        In this paper, we consider such a coordination problem in a dynamic 
framework, and investigate a way to remedy the problem. Related issues have 
been examined in literatures on network economics and coordination games. In 
the following, we briefly mention papers closely related with ours in these fields.  
    In  network  economics
1, Farrell and Saloner (1985) analyze a technology 
adoption problem using a model of incomplete information about firms' 
preference for new technology. They show that there are cases that a socially 
beneficial technology is not adopted as an outcome of a perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium ("excess inertia"). This can arise because each firm fears to adopt it 
solely, then waits and sees other firms' behavior, and as a result all firms remain 
status quo. They also show that nonbinding communication about preferences 
can remove some, but not all, types of the inefficiency. 
    In coordination game literature, Gale (1995) examines an investment decision 
of N players using a dynamic version of a direct payoff complementarity game 
(i.e. the payoff of each player is an increasing function of the number of 
investment activities). He shows that, given N, all players immediately invest 
after the game starts in any subgame perfect equilibrium, when the length of a 
unit period becomes sufficiently shorter. The reason for this result is that each 
                                                 
1 Katz and Shapiro (1985,1986) are another early contributions of network economics in the framework of 
New IO. Economides (1996) offers a useful overview of this field. Choi (1997) is a recent research on a 
similar theme.   4
player recognizes that his investment precipitates a subgame with few players, 
and that the assumption of the shorter unit period makes the quick attainment 
of the critical mass (i.e. the number of investment which makes each 
investment profitable). Therefore, this result indicates that the coordination 
problem disappears when the game has multiple decision stages for each player, 
if each player reacts quickly against other players' actions (an interpretation of a 
short unit period). However, he also shows that, given the length of a unit 
period, there exists a, but not a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium where no 
player invests, when the number of players becomes sufficiently larger. This is 
why, because of the large number of players, the critical mass attains after 
longer period which makes an investment decision of each player unprofitable
2. 
        While researches in network economics search for resolving on the 
coordination problem through establishing institutions or procedures among 
parties concerned, ones in coordination games examine more fundamental 
subjects such as the relationship between the structure of the game and 
equilibria attained. On the other hand, This paper adds some rules, which are 
discussed below for detail, to a model of Gale (1995), and examines whether the 
coordination among players is easily accomplished in an equilibrium. 
    Rauch (1993) has the similar spirit with our paper. He considers a relocation 
problem of firms from an old high-cost industrial park to a new low-cost park 
from a view point of a developer of the new park. When an industry is subject 
to agglomeration economies, the above-mentioned coordination problem 
occurs; no firm wants to move first to fear for being stranded in the new site, as 
a result, all firms do not move. He demonstrates that the developer can beat 
this passivity through discriminatory pricing of land over time. He also shows 
that empirical evidence in the United States supports his result
3. 
                                                 
2 Another strand of the field, which is called "herding" or "informational cascades", deals with games 
without direct payoff complementarity to analyze delay for learning some information from the 
behavior of others. Early contributions of the area are Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer 
and Welch (1992). Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) provide a compact review of this field, 
while Chamely (2003) is a textbook of comprehensive coverage of this area. Dasgupta (2000) is a recent 
research combining the element of herding with that of direct payoff complementarity. 
3 Matsumura and Ueda (1996) also show a similar result in a model of a technology adoption under 
incomplete information about the number of firms that can adopt the new technology   5
    A model developed in our paper differs from Rauch (1993) since we are 
concerned with some "neutral" rules from a view point of the government 
rather than profit-oriented rules by a developer. 
 
2.  The basic model 
We assume the same model as Gale (1995) and Gale (2000). We use notation 
of Gale (2000), because the notation is more sophisticate than Gale (1995). 
Consider a game with N players. Time is represented by a sequence of dates t 
= 1,2, . . . ∞. For simplicity, we assume that each player buys only one unit of 
the goods and the price of the goods is C>0. A player chooses a date t at which 
she buys the goods. Let  it x  describe state of player i at date t. If player i has not 
bought by the end of the date t, let  0 = it x . If player i has bought by the end of 
the date t, let  1 = it x .  The state of the game at date t is denoted by the vector 
of  it x ,  ( ) t N t t t x x x x , , , 2 1 L = . Let X denote set of all states. The history of the 
game at date t is denoted by  ( ) 1 1 , , − = t t x x h L . Let  t H   denote the set of 
histories at date t and Let  t H H ∪ =  denote the set of all histories. A pure 
strategy for player i is a function  { } 1 , 0 : → H i σ , where  ( ) t i h σ  for  t t H h ∈  is 
the state of the player i at date t, that is ( ) 1 1 , , − = t t i it x x x L σ . Let 
N σ σ σ σ × × ≡ L 2 1 . We assume strategies satisfy the following condition. 
 
Assumption 1 
() t i h σ =1 if  1 1 = − t i x  in history  t h  
 
The above assumption means players do not throw away the goods. From 
the assumption 1, states satisfy  1 − ≥ s s x x . 
The proportion of the players who have bought the goods by the end of date 








α . The more players buy the goods, the larger the utility that a   6
given user derives from the goods at date t,  ( ) t R α  is. That is, the utility from 
the goods at date t is an increasing function of  t α . Since the price of the goods 







− − ∑ δ δ α , where 0<δ <1 
is the common discount factor. The payoff to players who do not buy is zero. 
According to Gale(2000), let  ( ) ( ) ( )C R v k t δ α α − − = 1 . Using the function v, 






t v δ α . We assume the payoff 
function v satisfies the following conditions. 
 
Assumption 2. 











(c) v is continuous and strictly increasing. 
 
Assumption 2(a) guarantees that players can get positive payoff if all players 
buy the goods. That is, the state where all players buy the goods is better than 
the state where no player buy ones. However, from assumption 2(b), if only one 
player buys, the player gets negative payoff. Thus each does not wish to buy if 
all other players do not buy. 
    From the assumption 2, there is a condition such that buying the goods 
becomes a dominant strategy.  
 
Definition 1 (critical number of purchasers) 























If i* players have bought the goods, a player who has not bought yet obtains 
positive payoff with probability 1 by buying the goods.The above structure of 
the game is the same as the Gale(1995).   7
 
3.  The result of Basic model 
  We will refer some results of Gale(1995).  
 
Theorem 1 (Gale 1995) 
There exists a SPE in which all players buy the goods at date i*. 
 
The proof is in theorem 2 in Gale (1995). From the above theorem, strategic 
delay possibly occurs. 
 
Theorem 2 (Gale1995) 
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v L , then there exists a SPE in 
which no player buy the goods. 
 
From theorem 2, there is possibility such that no player buys the goods. This 
is Pareto inefficient equilibrium. 
We define partial order in history space as follows. 
 
Definition 2 (Partial order in finite history space) 
A partial order in histories is defined by  s t h h ˆ p  for  ( ) t t t H x x h ∈ = −1 1,.....,  
() s s s H x x h ∈ = −1 1 ˆ , , ˆ ˆ L ,  s t ≥  ⇔   ir ir x x ˆ ≤  for  1 − ≤ s r  and  is ir x x ˆ ≤  for 
1 1 − > ≥ − s r t . 
   8
Definition 3 (Partial order for infinite histories) 
Let  H h h ∈ ˆ ,  be  infinite  histories  ( ) ,....... , 2 1 x x h = ,  ( ) ,....... ˆ , ˆ ˆ
2 1 x x h = . Let 
() ( ) 1 2 1 ,......., , − = t t x x x h ρ  ,  ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 ˆ ,......., ˆ , ˆ ˆ
− = t t x x x h ρ  be the first t-1 history of 
h, h ˆ.  
We say that  h h ˆ p  if  () ( ) h h t t ˆ ρ ρ p  for any t. 
 
Example 1 
Consider the following two histories: 
(a) Player 1 bought the good at date 1. Player 2 bought the good at date 2. 
(b) Player 1 bought the good at date 1. Player 2 and Player 3 bought the good 
at date 2. 
More players bought goods in history (b) than in history (a). So we can guess 
more goods will be sold in history (b) than in history (a). By definition 3, history 
(b) is larger than history (a). 
 
Example 2 
Consider the following two histories: 
(a) Player 1 bought the good at date 1. Player 2 bought the good at date 2. 
(b) Player 1 and player 2 bought the good at date 1. Date 1 is the end if this 
history. 
2 goods are sold earlier in history (b) than in history (a). So we can guess 
goods will be sold out earlier in history (b) than in history (a). By definition 3, 
history (b) is larger than history (a). 
 
The order implies the degree how early and many players buy the goods. It is 
natural for players to have the conjecture that the greater the present history is, 
the earlier other players will buy the goods and the more riskless her purchase 
becomes. The following definition of monotonicity of strategy describes 
strategy under such conjecture.   9
 
Definition 4 (monotonicity of strategy) 
A strategy satisfies monotonicity if  ( ) ( ) t i s i h h σ σ ≥ ˆ   for all i and all 
histories s s H h ∈ ˆ , t t H h ∈  which satisfies t s h h f ˆ . 
 
It is natural for strategies of all players to have above monotonicity. So we 




Strategies of all players satisfy the monotonicity. 
 
Let  () h Γ  denote subgame which begins after finite history  H h∈ . Given a 
pure strategy profile σ , there is the only one history which will be realized in 
() h Γ . Let  () σ η , h  denote a history on  ( ) h Γ  which is determined by σ . Note 
that state in the first date of  ( ) σ η , h  is  ( ) h σ  not the first state in h. From the 
Assumption 1, we can get the following lemma  immediately. 
 
Lemma 1(monotonicity of histories) 
If   h h ˆ p  ,where h and h ˆ are finite histories, then  ( ) ( ) σ η σ η , ˆ , h h p  for any σ . 
 
Proof 
Suppose that  () t t t H x x x h ∈ = −1 2 1 ,....., ,   ( ) s s s H x x x h ∈ = −1 2 1 ˆ ,...., ˆ , ˆ ˆ  are  two 
finite histories such that  s t h h ˆ p   s t ≥ .  Suppose that  () ,.... , 2 1 y y = η , 
() H y y ∈ = ,.... ˆ , ˆ ˆ 2 1 η  are two histories such that  η η ˆ p  and  1 1 y xt ≤ −   1 1 ˆ ˆ y xs ≤ − .   10
Since  i s i x y + − ≥ 1 ˆ for  s t i − ≤  and  t s i i y y − + ≥ ˆ ,  ( ) ( ) η η ˆ , ˆ , s t h h p  where 
() ( ) ,.... , , ,....., , , 2 1 1 2 1 y y x x x h t t − = η  and ( ) ( ) ,.... ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ,....., ˆ , ˆ ˆ , ˆ
2 1 1 2 1 y y x x x h s t − = η . 
Suppose that   () ( ) ,..... , , 2 1 y y h = σ η  and that  ( ) ( ) ,..... ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
2 1 y y h = σ η  . If  h h ˆ p , 
then  ( ) ( ) h h ˆ σ σ ≤  from monotonicity of starategies. Since  ( ) 1 y h = σ  and 
( ) 1 ˆ ˆ y h = σ ,  1 1 ˆ y y ≤ . Since, by the first consideration, ( ) 1 , y h ( ) 1 ˆ , ˆ y h p , 
()( ) 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , y h y h σ σ ≤ . Hence ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 ˆ , ˆ , y y y y p .  By induction  ()( ) σ η σ η , ˆ , h h p . 
End of Proof 
 
Because state at each date in  ( ) h Γ  is determined by a strategy σ . Payoff is 
also determined by a strategy σ .  
 
 
Lemma 2(monotonicity of payoff) 
Let  () σ , h B  be payoff for a player who has bought in  ( ) h Γ  when players obey 
strategy profile σ . If  h h ˆ p , then  ( ) ( ) σ σ , ˆ , h B h B ≤  
Proof 
Let x and x ˆ be states. If x x ˆ ≤ , then the payoff for players who have bought 
in state x ˆ   is equal or larger than that in state x . Moreover the payoff for 
players who do not buy is fixed value zero. Hence the payoff for any players in 
state x ˆ is equal to or larger than that in  x. From lemma 1,  ( ) ( ) σ σ , ˆ , h B h B ≤ .  
 
End of proof. 
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Theorem 1 
There is no subgame perfect equilibrium of any subgame  ( ) h Γ  such that only 
one player perchase a good at date 2 and she gets positive payoff. 
Proof. 
Let  1 x   2 x be the sate at date 1 and 2 in  ( ) h Γ , respectively. Suppose that player i 
buys the goods at date 2 in  ( ) h Γ  and that the other players do not buy  at date 2 
in  () h Γ . Let  x #  is the number of players who have bought in state x. Payoff 
for player i is  () () σ δ δ , , ,
#
2 1








⎛ . When player i bought at date 1 in 
() h Γ . player i gets. Since ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 , , , x x h x h f ,  ( ) ( )( ) () σ σ , , , , , 2 1 2 x x h B x h B ≥  by 
lemma 2. Thus if () () σ δ δ , , ,
#
2 1










() () σ δ δ , , ,
#
2 1









< () () σ δ , ,
#
2








⎛ . This contradicts with 
the equilibrium condition. 
End of Proof 
 
Note that monotonicity does not solve the problem of strategic delay. However 
monotonicity, especially Theorem 1, plays an important role in the next section. 
 
 
4.  Heterogeneous options with refund contract 
 
  In order to solve the problem of strategic delay, we propose heterogeneous 
options with refund contract (hereafter HORC). This is a right to buy the good 
at fixed price which is similar to a call option in financial market. However, if   12
some condition is satisfied, purchasers of the option can get refund. And the 
condition is different among options.  
 
Definition 5 (Heterogeneous options with refund contract) 
Let  i O  be one of heterogeneous options with refund contract (HORC). There 
are n kinds of HORC,  i O  (i=0,1, . . .,n-1). Purchasers of HORC have a right to 
buy the good at a fixed price. However if i players buy the good at a date and if 
purchaser of  i O  have not bought the goods by the end of the next date, then 
she loses her right to buy the good. Moreover purchaser of  i O  can get refund if 
one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
 a) She buys the good before she loses her right to buy. 
 b) Some of  j O  j=0,. . .,n-1, remain unsold. 
 c)The number of the players who have bought the goods is smaller than i by 
the end of a period. 
 
 
In this section we impose the next assumption.  
 
Assumption 4 
If a purchaser of HORC loses her right, then she can not buy the good forever. 
 
This assumption is probably too strong, because we can not implement the 
assumption perfectly. Other players can buy the good for her and we can not 
detect every such cheating. However, the assumption helps to simplify the 
result of our model, so it is useful for understanding of the essence of HORC. 
We will loose this assumption in the next section. 
  From now, we will consider the case all players have bought HORC in this 
section. That is we will consider what would happen after HORC are sold out. 
Let  t t H S ⊂  be set of histories such that every player does not lose their 
right.  
   13
Theorem 2 















































* i in 
every SPE after they bought HORC. 
 
Proof 
Suppose that  H S
k ⊂  is a subset of histories such that no player lose their 
right and just i players have bought at the last date. Let 
*
h σ  be SPE strategy in. 
we will argue by induction. Let  ( ) k A  for  * i k ≤  denote an assertion such that 
()


























v h B  for 
k S h∈ ∀  
*










k k .  () * i A   is true, because every player gets positive payoff 
when buying goods. We will show  ( ) 1 − k A  is true if  ( ) k A  is true. Consider  () h Γ  
for 
1 − ∈
k S h . There is at least one player at the beginning of the subgame who 
has to decide whether she buys the good or loses her right to buy. She gets zero 
payoff if she loses their right, so she will buy the goods if they can get positive 
payoff by doing so. 
If  () k A  is true, for 
1 − ∈
k S h ,  ( )≥ h B h,
* σ  


































































Hence players who have to buy or lose their right will buy the goods. From 
theorem 1, they will get at least 














1 1 * 1 *
0





v . Thus  () 1 − k A  
is true. By induction,  () k A  is true for k=1,2,. . .i*. 
End of proof 
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From Theorem 2, if every player buys HORC, then every player gets positive 
payoff. If some players do not buy HORC, purchasers of HORC can get their 
money back due to refund contract. Buying HORC is weakly dominant strategy. 
 
 
5.  Price of HORC 
In the last section, assumption 4 plays an important role. Due to assumption 
4, the price of HORC can be zero. Theorem 2 does not need for HORC to 
have positive price. In this section, instead of assumption 4, we assume HORC 
has some positive price. If k goods are sold, players who bought  i O   k i ≥   have 
to decide whether to buy the good or to lose their right to get refund. We can 
guess players buy the goods without Assumption 4 if the price of HORC is high. 
Next theorem determines how much HORC should be.  
 
Theorem 3  

































































We will use the same notation as theorem 2.  ( ) * i A  is true in this game. We 
will show  () 1 − k A   is true if  ( ) k A  is  true.  If  ( ) k A  is  true,  then,  for 
1 − ∈
k S h , ()



































v h B . Because of 
monotonicity of strategy, the difference between payoff of losing right to get 
refund and of buying the goods is at most 
()
0












































v δ ξ δ ξ .Thus, buying the   15
goods is a dominant strategy. From theorem 2, 
( )≥ h B h,
* σ














1 1 * 1 *
0
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